Second is that coercive diplomacy is "not a military strategy at all but rather a political strategy." It involves using force in a "limited, selective manner . . . to induce the opponent to revise his calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict."2 Costs are to be inflicted on the adversary, but of a type and magnitude more geared to influence his decision than to physically impose one's will upon him. "The activity of the military units themselves," as Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan state in their study, "does not attain the objective; goals are achieved through the effect of the force on the perceptions of the actor."3 Coercive diplomacy thus is also distinct from what George calls a "quick, decisive military strategy," which "largely dispenses with threats, diplomacy or subtle modes of persuasion."4 The invasions of Grenada (1983) In all these cases the Reagan strategy was more than deterrence but less than a quick, decisive military strategy. Military force was used, not just threatened, but it was kept limited and geared to political objectives. Those political objectives were of two basic types: the imposition of foreign policy restraint on an adversary engaged in aggression or other actions deemed threatening to the United States; and the engineering of internalpolitical change within another state, whether in support of an existing government considered an ally or to overthrow a government considered an adversary. Both objectives were pursued to at least some degree in all five cases. I make two principal arguments in this article. First, with respect to the success and failure of coercive diplomacy, the Reagan record shows it to have been a much more effective strategy for imposing foreign policy restraint (for example, forcing Soviet troops out of Afghanistan, containing Iran in the Persian Gulf, limiting Muammar el-Qaddafi's role in international terrorism) than for engineering internal political change (bringing the Afghan mujaheddin or the Nicaraguan contras to power, ending the Lebanese civil war, eliminating Qaddafi).
Second, this differentiated pattern of coercive diplomacy effectiveness is to be explained, both for the Reagan-era cases and more generally, by three sets of con-to more than just foreign policy restraint. They were an unprecedented reversal of policy. Never before had the Red Army retraced its footsteps and withdrawn from a country it had invaded. Moreover, it did so on terms that hardly could be considered favorable. The length of the troop withdrawal period was both shortened and front-loaded. The Soviets conceded symmetry to the United States, allowing American military aid to the mujaheddin as long as Soviet aid to the Kabul regime continued. They also did not get any guarantees about the character or composition of a post-occupation Afghan government.
To be sure, a large share of the credit for the Soviet withdrawal unquestionably must go to the United Nations and in particular Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs Diego Cordovez for his mediating and facilitating role throughout the six years of on-and-off negotiations. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev also had his own reasons linked to his domestic and broader foreign policy agenda for ending what he himself called "this bleeding wound." But American military aid to the mujaheddin made sure the bleeding couldn't be stanched. As concluded in a report by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Soviet decision to withdraw was heavily influenced by "the ability of the Afghan mujaheddin to continue and increase their military opposition.... Fundamental to this improvement was a significant increase in military supplies to the rebels."6 American aid increased from only $30 million in 1983 to over $600 million by 1987. Moreover, beginning in mid-1986, it included the shoulder-fired Stinger surface-to-air m-issiles, later assessed by the Pentagon as "the war's deci. sive weapon."' Thus, while other factors and forces entered in, the Reagan administration had a genuine claim to a substantial share of the credit for the restraint/reversal in Soviet policy.
American policy has been much less successful, however, in its efforts to depose the Najibullah regime and bring the mujaheddin to power. Around the time of the final withdrawal of Soviet troops in February 1989, the CIA made bold predictions that it was only a matter of when, not if, the Najibullah regime would fall and the mujaheddin would triumph. However, while Najibullah has proven to be as unpopular as advertised -there have been at least two coup attempts, including one in March 1990 by his defense minister -the mujaheddin have been weakened by their own military failures and politico-religious factionalism. Soon after the Soviet withdrawal, they suffered a major military setback in their siege of Jalalabad. And from the outset, the interim government proclaimed in February 1989 has remained a shell without any real authority, unable to assert control even over its own ostensibly constituent groups.8 The concern expressed by one State Depart-6 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1987-88 (London: IISS, 1988), 135. 'The U.S. Army report has not been officially released, but was leaked in the Washington Post, 5 July 1989. 8 The difficulties of the interim government in asserting its control were exemplified by a report in the Washington Post, 24 July 1989, about Finance Minister Hedayat Amin-Arsala, who "operates from a hotel room in Peshawar .. . with a staff of volunteers and furniture partly paid for from his own pocket." ment official that the struggle among the mujaheddin factions "may make Lebanon look like child's play"9 was graphically underlined in July 1989 when fighters loyal to Gulbuddin Hekmatyr and his fundamentalist Hezb-i-Islami faction ambushed and murdered thirty leaders of a rival group. "In recent months," one observer reported, "so much of the rebel groups' energies have been expended in fighting among themselves that outsiders have been left to wonder if anything united them other than their resolve to rid Afghanistan of Soviet troops." Things got so bad that in February 1990 the Bush administration suspended its $30 million food aid program, because the food was "being stolen or sold to the Soviet-backed Afghan government."10 Thus, while coercive diplomacy worked when the principal objective was Soviet foreign policy restraint, it has failed as a strategy for reconstituting the internal Afghan political order. Quite to the contrary, with the Russians gone and the mujaheddin raging their own internecine warfare, "many Afglhans have begun to see the United States in a new guise, as a distant power that sanctioned the routine killing of civilians."'1 By early 1990 the Bush administration had initiated a major policy reassessment, questioning whether a more political and less military strategy was now needed.12
Persian Gulf Reflagging
The 1987-1988 Persian Gulf reflagging and naval deployment case has been characterized elsewhere as an "extended deterrence" strategy, and a failed one at that.13 When force is used to persuade an adversary to call off an action already initiated, as distinct from dissuading some presumably contemplated but not yet initiated action, the strategy is more accurately characterized as coercive diplomacy than deterrence of any form. This was the case in the Reagan Persian Gulf strategy. The Iran-Iraq war already had been going on for over seven years. Iran already was attacking Kuwait, both its shipping and its territory. Iran also already had been involved in efforts to foment Islamic fundamentalism and destabilize such key regional allies as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. And the Iranian imprint already was undeniably there in the hostage-taking by the Islamic Jihad and Hizbollah in Lebanon. There were many flaws in the Reagan strategy, in particular with the overtilt toward Iraq. It also may well be that had the Reagan administration not self-inflicted the Iran-contra and arms-for-hostages fiascos, some alternative strategy could have been better pursued. And while stopping short of overattributing credit to the exclusion of such other actors as the United Nations, the Reagan policy nevertheless does warrant an ample share. The presence of the U.S. Navy and its demonstrated willingness to meet Iranian provocations with both retaliatory and preventive military actions was key to keeping the sea lanes open while the war dragged on. It also provided Kuwait and other gulf states with at least a degree of protection from Iranian attacks, and in the process kept the Soviet role and presence limited. Only slightly more than a year after the reflagging operation began, it was a beleaguered Iran that agreed to a UN monitored ceasefire with Iraq on virtually the same terms it had previously rejected.
The strategy was not, however, cost-free, even in the immediate term. The costs were both budgetary (an estimated $250 million) and human, most especially the innocent lives lost in the accidental attacks by an Iraqi warplane on the USS Stark in May 1987 and by the USS Vincennes on a civilian Iran Air flight in July 1988. Moreover, as Janice Gross Stein rightly stresses, at a number of points the Reagan administration ran substantial risks "of becoming trapped in a process of escalation it could not control.""4 Nevertheless, it managed to avert such a trap and to keep the costs limited, while coercing Iran into a substantial and significant degree of foreign policy restraint.
Contrary to many hopes if not expectations, this did not lead to more generalized moderation in Iranian foreign policy. Blowing up a civilian airliner in midair, as Iran is alleged to have done to Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988, is not foreign policy moderation. 15 Nor was pronouncement of a death sentence against the foreign author of a book deemed offensive (Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Verses). Nor were the assassinations of dissident and opposition leaders in exile. Nor was the bomb placed under the minivan of Sharon Rogers of San Diego, California, wife of Will Rogers, U.S. Navy, captain of the USS Vincennes.
The major stab at engineering Iranian internal political change had come with the arms-for-hostages "opening to the moderates." That it was ill-conceived, among other things, is by now a given. In its wake, both in appearance and substance, the Reagan administration was very cautious about appearing to be meddling again in Iranian politics, although it hardly would have objected had the ayatollah been brought down during the Persian Gulf engagement. But he wasn't.
Following Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's death, many in the West were heartened when "the moderates" came out on top, with Ayatollah Ali Khameini chosen 14 Ibid., 148. as the new imam and Ali Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani elected president. Whatever his own dispositions may be, Rafsanjani has continued to face the dilemma that foreign policy militancy still has domestic political utility. The Ayatollah Khomeini's legacy, as embodied in his last will and testament, was one "of fierce animosity to the West, a militant assertion of Iran's Islamic identity."''6 Thus, it is not just a matter of whether Rafsanjani keeps hold of power. In order to do so he must guard against being painted as violating the legacy of Khomeini. He surely has been conscious of this, for example, in his unwillingness to join the U.S.-led multinational coalition against the man and country against which Iran fought an eightyear war.
Libya
The principal objective of the April 1986 bombing raid against Tripoli and Benghazi was antiterrorism. By early 1986 terrorism had become "a growth industry."17 The number of terrorist incidents was up 30 percent, the number of injuries about 80 percent, and the death toll almost 300 percent. Moreover, Americans were increasingly being targeted: a navy seaman killed during the June 1985 TWA hijacking, the elderly crippled Leon Klinghoffer thrown overboard the Achille Lauro, an eleven-year-old girl killed during the Christmas 1985 attacks in the Rome and Vienna airports, and then in early April 1986 the bombing of a West Berlin discotheque injuring 230 and killing two people, including an American soldier. Qaddafi was linked to a number of these incidents; in the West Berlin bombing, intelligence intercepts provided the veritable smoking gun. The Reagan administration later cited five other terrorist plots that had been thwarted but that also involved Qaddafi. There also were unconfirmed reports of plans by Qaddafi to launch a major terrorist campaign within the United States proper, including a plot to assassinate President Reagan."8 While far from a cure-all for the scourge of terrorism, the bombing of Libya had its impact in a number of ways. Qaddafi's operations and training centers were severely damaged. He himself was wounded in the attack, and for a time thereafter he appeared extremely disoriented. For nearly two years his role in terrorism fell off quite substantially. Moreover, in a more general antiterrorism sense, as stressed by RAND expert Brian Jenkins, the Libyan bombing "permanently altered the equation. Any nation contemplating terrorist action against the United States after April 15, 1986, had to take into account the possibility of American retaliation.""9 This obviously did not preclude all future terrorism, but it surely left the American threat to retaliate much more credible than if no action had been taken in the wake of such blatant aggression as the Berlin discotheque incident.
In addition, despite the immediate dispute with the NATO allies over their unwillingness to support the bombing raids (Britain excepted), the alliance came out with a stronger multilateral antiterrorism policy. A week after the bombing raids, the European Community foreign ministers issued a resolution condemning Libya, banning arms sales to it, and pledging to strengthen intelligence sharing, enforcement, and other antiterrorism collaboration. On 5 May, at the annual western heads of state summit, the seven leaders singled out Libya and pledged maximum efforts against it. In more concrete terms, approximately 500 Libyans (diplomats, other government officials, "students") were expelled from Western Europe. Oil imports were reduced, other contracts were canceled, and official credits were suspended by a number of European countries. Thus, while not endorsing the U.S. action per se, in their actions the Europeans followed the broader U.S. antiterrorism lead.
All of this was not without its costs. One bomber and its two-man crew were lost in action. An American diplomat in the Sudan and two American and one British hostage in Lebanon were murdered in retaliation. The death of one of Qaddafi's young daughters and the allegation that tnis was at its core an assassination attempt tarnished the U.S. claim to high moral ground. And over time Qaddafi reared his head anew. By 1988 he once again was heavily involved in terrorism, including a series of attacks "commemorating" the second anniversary of the 14 April bombing, including one planned for New York City through a Japanese operative who was fortuitously apprehended by a state trooper on the New Jersey Turnpike.
Then in late 1988 came the revelations that Qaddafi was building a chemical weapons plant. The course that this dispute ran illustrates both the scope and the limits of coercive diplomacy-imposed foreign policy restraint. On the one hand, when the Reagan administration threatened to bomb the Rabta plant, its record of having used military force against Libya made its threat a credible one. No one doubted that it might do so again -not the West German government, one of whose companies (Imhausen-Chemie) was identified as the outside contractor and not Qaddafi, who was not seen or heard publicly for two weeks at the height of the controversy. The Reagan threat had some effectiveness without having to be executed. However, in early 1990 intelligence reports indicated that construction had resumed and the Rabta plant was now in limited production. Shortly thereafter a mysterious fire ensued that was attributed to everyone from the CIA to the Israeli Mossad to West Germany to Qaddafi as a deceptive action. But many analysts still concluded that Libya now had at least a limited chemical weapons capacity.
It may well be that, as concluded in a CIA report, "no course of action short of stimulating Qaddafi's fall will bring any significant or ernduring change in Libyan dential election to the anti-Sandinista coalition led by Violeta Chamorro, former Reagan administration officials and other devotees of the contras have been quick to grab credit and claim vindication for the surrogate war they waged for almost a decade.29 Such historical judgments require more serious and thorough analysis than provided thus far on the op-ed pages and talk shows or than can be provided in summary form herein. But in the context of the argument of this article, I want to raise three reservations about the claiming of credit for the Reagan policy.
First is the attribution problem. There are at least two other key claimants and thus alternative explanations. One is the Nicaraguan people. On 25 February 1990, they did what they might have done any number of times in the past had they been given the opportunity to vote in a genuinely free election (but which they weren't, in large part because of U.S. support and intervention on behalf of the Somoza family dynasty): they threw out a corrupt and repressive regime. The Sandinistas grossly mismanaged the economy and systematically and often brutally repressed political opposition. They also engaged in personal corruption and conspicuous consumption that may well have been the most infuriating factor for the masses in whose name the revolution had been made.30 The vote in the 1990 election was anti-Sandinista, not pro-contra. The loser was Daniel Ortega. The winner was Violeta Chamorro, but not Adolfo Calero or Enrique Bermudez or Comandante Suicida.
The other strong claimant is Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez and his peace plan. Granted, the military pressure from the contras was a factor in the Sandinistas' acquiescence to an election. But given that by the time of the election U.S. military aid to the contras had already been cut off for almost two years, and that U.S. domestic political realities made it highly unlikely that military aid would be resumed other than in the most extreme circumstances, this claim also is a weak one. The Arias peace plan, in contrast, provided the impetus and set the terms for the elections despite the Reagan administration having labeled it fundamentally flawed and having taken a number of actions intended to override if not undermine it.
But even if one were to accept some attribution for the Reagan policy, there remains the problem of factoring the costs incurred. There were, after all, thousands of Nicaraguans killed, wounded, displaced and whose lives were disrupted or shattered by the years of so-called low-intensity war. While there is no ready formula or model for such net assessments, they also cannot be ignored. Moreover, a realistic accounting must also include the toll taken on our own country. Here I mean less the budgetary costs than the political ones of bitter ideological warfare and especially the threats raised to the integrity of U.S. constitutional order by the actions of Oliver North and Company. Finally and rather ironically, there were the missed opportunities along the way for progress on the regional security/foreign policy restraint issues that ostensibly were the official original rationale for supporting the contras, but for which a definite pattern of Reagan administration disinterest and evasiveness can be traced. Some examples:
. In early 1981, even before aid to the contras had begun, there was evidence (substantiated by, among others, CIA Deputy Director Bobby Inman) that other coercive measures such as the suspension of foreign aid already were leveraging the Sandinistas into cutting back their arms supplies to the Salvadoran FMLN (Farabundo Marti Liberation Front).3" As time went on, interdiction by the contras "became a joke," one State Department official observed, "as the contras grew without interdicting so much as a helmet liner."32 . In late 1983, in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Grenada, the Sandinistas "took a series of unilateral steps addressing the security issues about which the United States-had complained . .. and communicated to Washington that they ... were seeking a reciprocal gesture." Instead, the war party within the Reagan administration did everything it could to undermine negotiations.33 * The following year, when the Contadora process appeared close to yielding an agreement on regional security, a National Security Council background paper boasted of having "trumped" the draft treaty.34 * While some dutiful public lip service was paid to the Arias Plan (it did, after all, win its author a Nobel Peace Prize), the Reagan administration did more to punish than reward President Arias's efforts. It held up foreign aid payments to Costa Rica, provided information that led to the arrest of an Arias political supporter on charges of drug money laundering (while ignoring allegations of even more egregious activities by contra leaders), and accused the Arias government of foreign aid mismanagement on the basis of an audit so filled with inaccuracies that the U.S. ambassador disowned it.35 In sum, the Reagan claim to credit for Nicaraguan internal political change is at best a limited one, weakened by both the costs incurred and the opportunities foregone. 
POLICY OBJECTIVES AND THE CONSTRAINTS ON COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

Usability of Military Options
The military requisite of coercive diplomacy as defined by Alexander George is that a state has the capacity to wield force in a "controlled, discriminating manner" while also raising the adversary's fear of unacceptable escalation. The foreign policy restraint objective has two advantages in this regard. First, as a more limited objective in political terms, it has a greater proportionality with the limited applications of military force. As George also states, the task of coercion is determined or set by the magnitude of the opponent's motivation not to comply and that this, in turn, is a function of his perception of what is demanded of him. Asking very little of an opponent makes it easier for him to permit himself to be coerced. Conversely, demanding a great deal of an opponent . .. makes the task of coercing him all the more difficult.36
In contrast, there is a disproportionality between the limited coercive means available and the more maximal political objective of remaking the internal politics of another country. Second is the tactical advantage of a more favorable balance of relative vulnerability, which is defined as the ability to limit the exposure of American forces while being able to strategically target and expose the adversary's vulnerabilities. The foreign policy restraint objective is more readily pursued from a distance through surprise attacks and other limited forms of direct engagement. But the internal political change objective tends to require more open-ended commitments, either directly with American forces or through surrogates. Moreover, when it is power and not just policies at stake, whatever an adversary's vulnerabilities may be, the adversary is likely to be infused with a heightened willingness to bear the costs in the name of survival.37
The The same military options, however, have proven much less usable for the internal political change objective. In their effort to seize power from the Najibullah government, the mujaheddin no longer could rely on the guerrilla tactics they used so well to target Soviet vulnerabilities. They now had to fight in the more conventional style of an army trying to take cities such as Jalalabad, at which they were inexperienced, poorly trained, and themselves vulnerable. Moreover, they increasingly resorted to sieges, indiscriminate shellings, and other tactics that have alienated the civilian population. Both proportionality and relative vulnerability thus shifted unfavorably.
In Nicaragua, the uncle-saying objective to which the Reagan administration aspired was quite disproportionate to the limited military means at its disposal. The desire to acquire greater military means than Congress was prepared to appropriate, rather than scale back its political objectives, led the Reagan administration into the questionable and in some instances unconstitutional practices of Iran-contra arms dealings, of independent fund raising in wealthy conservative circles, and of quid pro quos with third party governments. The usable military options problem, though, was much more endemic than just a shortage of funds. Levels of funding aside, the contras showed themselves to be quite unreliable and ineffective as a military force. After one of his frequent trips to the field, Oliver North's courier Robert Owen complained that "there are few of the so-called leaders ... who really care about the boys in the field. This has become a business to them." More aid, Owen told North, will be "like pouring money down a sinkhole "39 As to the balance of relative vulnerability, American exposure was limited in that troops never were committed. But through the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, the preparation of an "assassination" manual, the military build up in Honduras, the 1986 crash of American mercenary Eugene Hasenfus's supply plane, and numerous other incidents and activities of the CIA and their operatives, the American position was all too exposed. Thus, while the Sandinistas definitely had their vulnerabilities, the contras and the Reagan administration were not particularly adept at targeting them. 36 Washington Post, 5 July 1989. 39 Chace, "The End of the Affair?" 30.
In Lebanon there also was a serious disproportion between the type of military commitments and both the nature and the depth of the political problems. This was true even with regard to the very idea that a program of professional training would be sufficient to depoliticize the Lebanese army. As Ze'ev Schiff has observed:
The Lebanese Army can play a part in consolidating the power of the government only if a prior political agreement can be reached between the central government and at least one of the major confessional groups, in addition to the Christians. History shows that without that agreement the army crumbles when asked to fight either Shiites or Druze.40 Nevertheless, U.S. Defense Department officials contended that "dealing with Lebanese factional politics was not their job; they were simply to train the Lebanese to be good soldiers." State Department officials also begged off, claiming "they felt unqualified to do more than urge the Lebanese in a general sense to reconcile their factional politics.""4
Moreover, the balance of relative vulnerability was immensely unfavorable. On the one side was an adversary(ies) who had the benefits both of terrorist tactics and of the willingness to sacrifice imbued by their fundamentalist zealotry. On the other side were the U.S. Marines at fixed positions while being limited to peacetime rules of engagement and carrying out an uncertain mission. Their original deployment had proceeded from the premise that they would be operating in a "relatively benign environment." Long before the 23 October 1983 barracks bombing, though, it should have been clear, as stressed in the Long Commission report, that "the environment could no longer be characterized as peaceful." The terrorism against the Marines was "tantamount to an act of war," yet they still were not "trained, organized, staffed or supported to deal effectively with the terrorist threat."42 Thus, when the terrorist truck bomber attacked the Marine barracks in the middle of the night, he encountered sentries who, in accordance with their peacetime rules of engagement, were carrying unloaded weapons -exposed and vulnerable. "A floating Beirut" was the dire warning sounded when the reflagging and naval operations first began in the Persian Gulf. But while the military operations did have quite a few flaws (not the least of which was lumbering into the gulf without minesweepers), this was another instance in which military force did prove usable for a foreign policy restraint objective. Proportionality was maintained by keeping the use of force limited largely to retaliatory and preventive attacks, and by targeting primarily offshore and coastal sites of military and economic value but with minimal civilian presence. The tactical advantage was solidified by the cooperative deployments by other western navies, minesweepers included. By 30 September 1987, some seventy European naval vessels had been deployed to the gulf by Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Each of these fleets was operating under its own national command, but together they amounted to the largest international fleet assembled since the Korean War.
The balance of relative vulnerability also was quite favorable. The war with Iraq had been going badly for Iran for over a year, with the Basra offensive in particular having gained some land but at the expense of 45,000 casualties. The Iranian economy was in deep trouble. Crude oil exports were down to less than one million barrels a day; in fact, Iran was having to import some petroleum products. National income, at $15 billion as recently as 1985, had plummeted to $6.5 billion. Reports emanating from within Iran talked about foreign exchange reserves being depleted, unemployment and inflation both running high, and some food being rationed.43 Thus, while the costs the United States incurred were not inconsequential, they still were far less than those borne by a nation already at war for over seven years, with staggering death tolls and an economy in deep crisis. Even the Ayatollah Khomeini could not continue to muster the fervor necessary to sustain the will to bear such costs.
In A second differential constraint is the stronger claim the foreign policy restraint objective can make to international legitimacy. Principles of nonaggression, national self-determination, and the rights of sovereignty -however abused in practice they have been -are the closest the international system has to a universal set of rules and norms. A coercive diplomacy strategy mounted to restrain an aggressor nation in defense of these basic principles, therefore, can draw upon historical tradition as well as canons of international law for its justification. In addition to the importance in its own right of the moral authority that comes with international legitimacy, even more important is that in practical terms this can convert into the greater coercive potential of a broad-based international coalition, which brings to bear the authority and resources of other countries and of international institutions, along with those of the United States.
The Reagan administration, however, did not see it this way. It assumed that there could be no higher calling than to rid the world of Marxist-Leninist regimes and others it deemed illegitimate. This was the essence of the Reagan Doctrine and its "mission" to "nourish and defend freedom and democracy and to communicate these ideals everywhere we can."46 Internationally, however, there were few other subscribers to this view, even among other western liberal democratic societies. Part of the disaffection was that few other countries so readily share the ABC blanket criterion -anything but communism -for regime legitimacy. Even more fundamental was the concern, as identified by and particularly the military aid and training provided to the Lebanese Armed Forces, the United States no longer could make a sustainable claim in any eyes other than its own to being an honest, impartial broker. The American role consequently was transformed from one of "disinterested peacekeeping" to "partisan intervention" for which it could not credibly claim international legitimacy.52 The Libyan case requires some reading between the lines and separating of actions from rhetoric. The General Assembly did pass a resolution condemning the U.S. bombing, but the overall reaction within the UN was much tamer and more pro forma than might have been expected. Among the western allies, while only Britain was willing to support the actual bombing mission, a week later the European Community issued a resolution condemning Libya, banning arms sales to it, and pledging to strengthen intelligence sharing, enforcement, and other antiterrorism collaboration. Approximately 500 Libyans (diplomats, other government officials, "students") were expelled from Western Europe. Oil imports were reduced, other contracts were canceled, and many official credits were suspended. Thus, while not endorsing the U.S. action per se, the Europeans followed the broader 
Domestic Political Opposition
If consensus could always be manufactured through public relations campaigns, then it would not matter whether one policy objective was more inherently disposed to low domestic constraints than another. Like Harry Truman and Dean Acheson in the selling of the lYuman Doctrine, the right words and framing of an issue could evoke support even from a reluctant Congress and isolationist public. But precisely because of Ronald Reagan's well-deserved reputation as the Great Communicator, the limits of his capacity to forge consensus on issues like Nicaragua is all the more significant. Today the Congress is less automatically deferential, the public is much more attentive, and the executive branch itself is less strictly unitary than in the past.55 Whether or not this is a positive or negative development for American foreign policy is a separate question. The relevant point here is that because domestic constraints are that much more prevalent than in the past, the inherent dispositions that different types of issues carry toward higher or lower constraints are that much more important.
Public Opinion. In terms of public opinion it is useful to apply William Schneider's distinction between valence and position issues." Valence issues involve threats to shared basic values and thus tend to evoke consensual reactions, while position issues allow for legitimate alternative preferences on values and thus a more divisive politics. The pursuit of foreign policy restraint by an aggressor state is more likely to be treated as a valence issue for two reasons. First, the threat is much clearer, present, and dangerous: blatant violations of basic American principles such as national self-determination (Afghanistan), immediate threats to vital American geopolitical and economic interests (Persian Gulf reflagging), and direct aggression against American citizens (Libya), as compared to keeping somebody else's peace (Lebanon) and deposing the government of a tiny country because of a still hypothetical threat (Nicaragua). or their quickness (Libya) -were far preferable to those that did entangle (Lebanon) or risked extended involvement (Nicaragua). The Persian Gulf reflagging case was more direct and less quick-and-out, and thus could be expected to show greater tension within public opinion, although not nearly as much as the more direct and entangling Lebanon commitment.
Public opinion poll data substantiate these propositions.58 On a cross-case basis, public support was highest in the cases of Libya (average support score of 65.2 percent even in prebombing polls) and the Persian Gulf (55.5 percent), and lowest for Nicaragua (27.3 percent when asked about contra aid, 19.7 percent when asked about a U.S. invasion). On an intracase basis, when questions were asked disaggregating foreign policy restraint and internal political change objectives, the pattern is further corroborated. In the Libya case, questions about overthrowing or assassinating Qaddafi elicited an average score of only 29 percent. In the Nicaragua case, those questions asking specifically about using force for regional military deployments to deter Nicaraguan threats to other countries (35.2 percent), and an invasion of Nicaragua if it allowed a Soviet missile base (45 percent) -for foreign policy restraint -got higher levels of support.
Congress. The usual portrayal of legislative-executive politics is of the assertive Reagan administration pushing to "stand tall" and show that "America is back" vs. the retreatist Congress, reflexively pulling back from using force. In fact the pattern was not nearly so singular.
On the political obstruction and personal condemnation he encountered within the administration for his efforts to treat peace talks as something more than just a way of providing "a plausible negotiating track" for public relations purposes. Then, of course, there were the operations of Oliver North and his minions, intended to go around not only Congress but also normal channels within the State Department and the CIA.62
In the Lebanon case, revealingly, perhaps the most scathing criticism of the intervention came from within the military, in particular from the Long Commission. Secretaries George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger waged a very public debate, which grew out of Lebanon and came to involve the more general issue of the use of force. Shultz strongly opposed withdrawing the Marines from Beirut, especially after the barracks bombing. "If we are driven out of Lebanon," he argued, "our role in the world is that much weakened everywhere." At stake were America's responsibilities as the world's leading "defender of freedom, justice and peace," responsibilities from which "we cannot walk away . .. without paying a moral and a political price." Secretary Weinberger rejected this argument both in its specific and general forms. He played a key role in President Reagan's decision in February 1984 to withdraw the Marines under the ostensibly credible guise of an "offshore deployment." And while stopping well short of rejecting coercive diplomacy, later in the year he sounded "a note of caution" in laying out a series of preconditions for the use of military force.63
In contrast, both Weinberger and Shultz supported both the bombing of Libya and the Persian Gulf reflagging naval deployment. For Weinberger they both met his tests. For Shultz they were cases par excellence of his broader argument. The criticisms of the Persian Gulf operation, of which there were many within the executive branch, largely were about tactics and not questions of the use of force in itself. Thus, while well short of pure harmony, the intra-administration divisions in both the deliberations and execution of policy when force was being used primarily to coerce foreign policy restraint were much more confined and controlled. States still has for containing aggression. The Afghan mujaheddin had many supporters, but it's difficult to imagine them having forced the Soviet Red Army back across its border without U.S. support -diplomatic and military, even more than financial. With Qaddafi there was no one else willing to take up the challenge. Similarly, with Iran in the Persian Gulf, while there were many other actors, the American role appears to have been the crucial one.
The modalities by which force was brought to bear differed in all three of these cases: in effect, one was by land, one by sea, one by air. But in all three instances the use of force was kept limited, controlled, and discriminating. The costs imposed on the adversaries were substantial in their own right, as well as credibly foreboding of even higher costs that could follow. Yet the strategies remainedfundamentally political ones. In both the Afghanistan and Persian Gulf reflagging cases, the use of military force did not stand on its own but was linked to diplomatic efforts to negotiate settlements. Both the coercive and the diplomatic components, not just one or the other, were at work. In the Libyan case there was no such diplomatic process, but even here the use of military force was intended more to persuade than defeat. When we speak of effectiveness, therefore, we are speaking of force combined with diplomacy, not force on its own. The Soviets were not about to withdraw from Afghanistan without at minimum the face-saving cover that a negotiated settlement provided. Nor could Iran have been expected to surrender to Iraq, which had started the war.
The cases also showed that uses of force by the United States do not inherently have insurmountable problems of international legitimacy. Support would be too strong a word, but acceptance fits. The United Nations never endorsed per se American aid to the mujaheddin, or the Kuwaiti reflagging, or surely not the bombing of Libya. But the first two were accepted on balance as complements to, if not de facto operational extensions of, UN resolutions. The UN criticism of the Libyan bombing was rather pro forma, a dutiful nod more than a vehement protest. With the NATO allies, the broader concern about keeping the alliance's mission confined to the North Atlantic region, as well as some specific policy differences, precluded formal collaboration or specific endorsement. But the allies still managed in the Afghanistan, Libya, and Persian Gulf reflagging cases (and initially in Lebanon) to express general support for the objectives being pursued and to find ways to work with the United States. Key countries within the respective regions provided even greater support. And they did so not just as American clients, as was more the case in the 1950s, but for their own self-interested reasons. This made them more independent, often to the displeasure of the Reagan administration, but it also gave the United States a much stronger claim to international legitimacy.
At home, support for coercive diplomacy was shown to be not out of the question, but to depend on its purpose. Support was most tenuous in the Persian Gulf reflagging case because of concern about the costs and risks of the military operations. But here too it still held. Nor were "divided government" and the partisan and institutional competitions which are its outgrowth an excessive constraint. Congress and the president found constructive ways to work together. The Amer-ican public was supportive, but not blindly so. The executive branch avoided many of the pitfalls of bureaucratic politics. The American political system, in sum, showed itself not to be as broke as so often accused.
None of these conclusions should be taken too far. Three limiting conditions are to be noted. First, the claim of effectiveness needs to be tempered by the distinction between immediate and generalized foreign policy restraint. As both the Persian Gulf-Iran and Libya cases demonstrate, the achieving of the one does not necessarily lead to the other. A key part of the problem here is the extent to which sustained conflict with the United States has domestic political utility within the adversary state. This in a sense parallels the argument about domestic constraints within U.S. policy. In the one it is a matter of the domestic political will to carry out coercive diplomacy; in the other it is a matter of the domestic political will to resist it. The common point is that foreign policy strategy is not exclusively a matter of calculations of interstate interactions, be they military or diplomatic. All the military calculations may line up, all the rules for effective negotiation may be followed, but if the leaders of the adversary have an interest in manipulating and fomenting the image of the United States as an enemy, they will continue to do so. The threat posed thus can be transformed from a compellent for compliance to a basis for continued resistance and aggression.
Second, it may be that the immediate objective is achieved but in the process the strategy is distorted in ways that create new threats -as did the Reagan and Bush administrations with their overtilting toward Iraq. Neither the failure to oppose Iraq's use of chemical weapons nor the near total relaxation of antiproliferation controls on trade with Iraq were necessary parts of the anti-Iran strategy. Nor were the exceedingly soft diplomatic signals sent to Saddam Hussein by key Bush administration officials in late July 1990 at the same time that he had escalated his rhetoric, made explicit threats, and mobilized his troops and tanks. Coercive diplomacy could have worked against Iran without these excesses and failures against Iraq.
Third, the extent of foreign policy restraint is not to be exaggerated. Coercive diplomacy is by definition a strategy of limited means. In all of the Reagan era cases, the force used was limited. The same has been true for the Bush administration's initial response against Iraq. However, the decisions taken by the Bush administration in early November 1990 to double the military deployment and move to an offensive military strategy indicated a belief that this was a case in which the adversary was so resistant that limited force would not suffice. Whether or not a continued strategy of limited force could have worked will never be known. Given the Bush administration's assessment of Saddam Hussein, it believed the only viable strategies were to escalate the degree of force to the outer edges of a coercive diplomacy strategy (the military build-up, the 15 January 1991 ultimatum) or, ultimately, to go to war.
The more severe constraint on what coercive diplomacy can achieve concerns the engineering of internal political change. The central point is not that the Reagan policies failed, but that coercive diplomacy as a foreign policy strategy has intrinsic disadvantages when put to this purpose. There still may be situations like Grenada and Panama, where it is possible to mount a military operation to overthrow a government. But those are unique cases from which it would be dangerous to generalize and which involve a quite separate strategy from coercive diplomacy. In Lebanon, American casualties were substantial. In Nicaragua, while others bore the casualties, the United States had the albatross of an open-ended commitment. In post-Soviet withdrawal Afghanistan, military force has not been nearly so usable as it was for getting the Soviets to withdraw.
These cases also show how and why the remaking of governments lacks international legitimacy. In Lebanon, the United States forfeited the legitimacy it started with as it transformed its strategy from honest broker/peacekeeper to supporter/sponsor of the Gemayel regime. In Nicaragua, the Reagan policy never could credibly claim any significant international legitimacy. The specific objective of overthrowing the Sandinistas and the more general precedent of making selfdetermination selectively applicable only to certain types of political systems as determined unilaterally by the United States were rejected by the western allies, by the countries in the region, and by the United Nations.
Finally, the domestic constraints, especially on Nicaragua policy, have to be seen as commentaries on the policies themselves. It's not that Congress, the American public, or the professionals within the State Department won't let the president use military force. One might even argue that these actors and institutions showed a much shrewder, more discriminating -yes, more realistic -sense of strategy than the Reagan administration. But even leaving such policy judgments aside, the objective fact is that broad political support is much less possible for efforts to overthrow, destabilize, or otherwise remake governments. This cannot be equated as a systemic malfunction. It is politics as it is supposed to work in the American political system: checks and balances, the separation of powers, and public debate over what United States policy should be.
That this is a dilemma is not to be denied. The kinds of governments other states have does affect Americans and American interests. Other foreign policy strategies, however, are necessary. Coercive diplomacy has its scope. It also has its limits. The realization of both together, but neither alone, is crucial to a truly realistic foreign policy.* 
